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Global historians do not form a separate species. In their daily professional lives 
they do not differ dramatically from their colleagues working in fields that are 
more narrowly circumscribed. While global history appeals to audiences in more 
than one country, and, ideally, in more than one linguistic area, while it’s support-
ing networks are more extensive and more cosmopolitan than those of national or 
micro-regional history, it remains rooted in individual academic cultures. There-
fore, global historians inhabit overlapping worlds of scholarship and communi-
cation. They speak to the world, but most of them continue to work in contexts 
where they share the mundane problems of teaching, surviving or shaping academic 
administra tion and addressing all sorts of publics, many of them of a distinctly 
national character. This is not be deplored. A global history existing exclusively 
within a sphere of disembodied supra-nationality would isolate itself from natural 
communities of discourse. The global historian rarely escapes from some sort of 
national identification, if only a highly attenuated one. Even if he or she does not 
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deliberately adopt and cultivate a national point of view, certain institutional and 
communicative constraints stand in the way of an uncontaminated globalism.
All this may be least true for global historians writing in English. But even 
they, who can count on being understood all over the world, sometimes betray a 
specific colouring of their concerns and their writing. British styles of global and 
world history are not completely identical with approaches from the United States. 
Australian, Indian or South African historians, even if they deny any interest in 
national history, cannot always obliterate their national historical experience and 
a hidden national agenda. If global history is being written in Chinese, Japanese or 
Arabic, in Russian, French or German, its authors’ principal concern is the public 
at home. Even those who do not place themselves within older national traditions 
of world history writing, are compelled to engage a domestic audience that expects 
global issues being framed in terms of their relevance for the present and future of 
the home society.
The present paper elaborates and illustrates this claim for the case of Ger-
many – no longer the main site of the production of world historical knowledge, 
but still one of those countries where strong efforts are being made to keep abreast 
of recent historiographical developments.1 Side-glances at Austria and (germano-
phone) Switzerland round off the picture. The following explanations are based on 
the assumption that work published in German is not readily accessible to a vast 
majority of scholars working in (or interested in) the field of global historical stud-
ies. Beyond this mundane and highly pragmatic consideration, it is not ob vious 
to treat German contributions to global history as a distinct, independent and 
clearly demarcated discourse. Some of the best work by German historians is now 
published in English, and it is extremely difficult, and ultimately futile, to look for 
traces of its “Germanness”. A growing number of these historians, especially among 
the younger generation, have migrated to universities in the United States, Great 
Britain, Japan or to such extraterritorial and cosmopolitan academic locations as 
the European University Institute at Florence. They carry with them their Ger-
man training without self-consciously transplanting any characteristically German 
tradition.2 The reasons for this recent brain drain are manifold: a bottleneck in 
career patterns making it difficult to obtain tenured positions in German academia, 
a decline of the average professorial remuneration at state universities since the 
introduction of a new salary scale a few years ago and a higher teaching load than 
elsewhere in the Western world. “Transnational” careers of this kind, still few in 
number, point to an increasing globality of the practice of global history. The histo-
rian of historiography, however, has the task to report on the past.3
It should be added that my own work as far as it relates to global and world 
history has never been self-consciously German. Earlier monographs on British 
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imperialism and Chinese nationalism during the Nanjing period (1927–1937), on 
China’s position in the world since the eighteenth century and on Asia in European 
thought between 1680 und 1830, complemented by shorter books on the Chinese 
revolution, on colonialism and on the history of globalization,4 led to an attempt 
to write a world history of the nineteenth century that was published in 2009.5 The 
systematic foundations for that project were laid in a collection of articles on the 
theory and history of historiography.6 Since these books were mostly written within 
the context of German history departments and published with German publishing 
houses, they inhabit an intellectual space confined by the limits of a scholarly and 
literary idiom that continues to lose ground in international communication. My 
personal views are not representative of world/global history in Germany, and the 
present paper is not written from within the “field” (if there is one: we shall see), 
but rather from the point of view of a semi-detached observer who has been active 
since the early 1980s in promoting transnational and global approaches of various 
kinds, who has some additional research experience in the history of Republican 
China, but who teaches conventional courses in late modern European history and 
in the history of international relations. My approach to world history is eclectic. In 
historiographical practice it aims at a combination of aspects and approaches that 
should probably be kept apart in theoretical terms.7
Varieties of Macrohistory
In a carefully crafted manual on world history writing like the one by Patrick Man-
ning one finds discussions of and hints at a great number of dead German (or 
Swiss or Austrian) classics – in Manning’s case: Jacob Burckhardt, Wilhelm Dilthey, 
Norbert Elias, Sigmund Freud, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Johann Gottfried 
Herder, Karl Jaspers, Karl Marx, Oswald Spengler, Alfred Weber and Max Weber –, 
but not one single reference to a living author from the German-speaking coun-
tries.8 The only contemporary German theorist sometimes mentioned in world 
history literature, if not by Manning, is the philosopher Jürgen Habermas, definitely 
not a global historian, with his venerable concept of the “public sphere”, introduced 
in 1962.9 What happened to the German Great Tradition of world history?
First, let us look at the current bibliographical situation. The term Globalge-
schichte (global history) is not yet well-established in German scholarly literature. 
In early February 2009, the catalogue of the German National Library (Deutsche 
Nationalbibliothek) recorded 12 books with ‘Globalgeschichte’ in their title, one 
of them a translation of Christopher Bayly’s The Birth of the Modern World.10 The 
earliest of the references dates from 1994: a special issue of the journal Comparativ, 
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edited in Leipzig.11 Most of the eleven books originally written in German form 
part of two semi-popular series of collections of chapters and articles published 
in Vienna.12 The most ambitious publication to date is of recent origin.13 The only 
monograph carrying Globalgeschichte in its title remains the translation of Bayly’s 
famous work. Another terminological innovation, Transnationale Geschichte, made 
its first German appearance, at least on a title page, as late as 2006.14 By early 2009, 
no other book had adopted that term, though it has become quite popular with the 
authors of articles. Things are, of course, vastly different as far as the old term Welt-
geschichte is concerned. Here the catalogue of any large research library will yield 
2,000 items or more, the earliest ones dating from the eighteenth century. 
In Germany, as elsewhere, terminological confusion surrounds the various con-
cepts related to history in a non-national mould and in the long run – “macrohis-
tory” as it might be called.15 For the practical purposes of the present paper, I sug-
gest a number of simple definitions, disregarding the fact that each of my solutions 
would be hotly contested by other German historians. While these proposals do not 
express a consensus among German historians, they are meant to instil a measure 
of precision into the subsequent remarks.16 
Universal History is the construction of goal-oriented, teleological (nothing 
wrong with this on principal grounds) narratives pertaining to mankind in its 
entirety. It is based on the conviction that behind the material surface of history the 
unfolding of “meaning” (Sinn der Geschichte) in recognizable shapes (stages, long 
waves, etc.) can be discerned by the philosophically-minded historian or sociolo-
gist.
World History is a de-centred, and certainly non-eurocentric, perspective, 
detached, as far as possible, from the concrete circumstances and the national 
identity of the observer, on the varieties of social and cultural life across time and 
space, focussing on distinct features of macro-units such as “civilizations”, “empires” 
or “nation-states”, on identities within such units, on special paths and trajectories 
and on particular ways of problem-solving in response to ecological and economic 
challenges. World History considers interaction between peoples, but does not 
privilege it at the expense of internal developments. It only deserves its name when 
it is more than a mere addition of regional histories. In other words: World History 
is meaningless without some kind of comparative approach.
Transnational History is the history of movements of human beings, knowledge 
and objects transgressing the limits of social units that define their identity through 
political order and/or ethnic solidarity. These movements need not be of planetary 
scope and do not necessarily have to cross “civilizational” boundaries. They often 
lead to complex “entanglements” between neighbouring societies. Transnational 
history, narrowly defined, presupposes the historical emergence of the nation-state. 
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The term should therefore be applied to pre-modern periods only with a certain 
degree of caution. 
Global History Mark 1 (in a narrow sense) is the history of the continuous, but 
not linear intensification of interactions across vast spaces and of the crystallization 
of these interactions into extended networks or, sometimes, institutions which usu-
ally possess their own hierarchical structure. The tension between the global and the 
local is crucial for this approach. It makes little use of the concept of “civilizations” 
and considers places and regions as the nodal points from which networks are being 
constructed.
What all these modes of historical thinking have in common is that they con-
tribute to “history beyond the nation-state” (“Geschichtswissenschaft jenseits des 
Nationalstaats”),17 put differently, to “a project to reconstruct aspects of the human 
past that transcend any one nation-state, empire, or other politically defined terri-
tory”.18 This project does not render national history obsolete and refuses to deny its 
legitimacy, but it underscores the historicity and contingency of nation and nation-
state. It rests upon a critique of euro-centrism and grants equal “agency” to all inhab-
itants of the planet without ignoring the preponderance of “the West” in shaping the 
“modern” world. We might also call it Global History Mark 2, that is, Global History 
in a wider sense. In terms of the other definitions given above, it encompasses Global 
History Mark 1, Transnational History and comparative World History, but excludes 
Universal History and also World History in its manifestation as a Spenglerian his-
tory of individual and unconnected “cultural arenas” (Kulturkreise).
Paths towards World History/Global History
Global historians Mark 2 in a German context can loosely und liberally be defined 
as people who do not exclusively work within a framework of national history (any 
national history: not just German history, but also French, Mexican or Japanese 
history) and who also display a certain interest, based upon some amount of read-
ing of specialist literature, in the history of a continent other than “one’s own”, i.e. a 
historian of Europe should be roughly familiar with China or Africa and a historian 
specializing in Vietnam or the Caribbean should know something about Europe. 
Prior to the current generation of Ph.D. candidates (if only at a small number 
of universities), nobody in Germany ever had a chance of being trained from the 
outset in the study of global phenomena. There were no “global studies” and hardly 
any university courses in Weltgeschichte. Today’s better-known world historians 
arrived at their position by a variety of different paths and from widely diverging 
starting-points:
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1. … from the study of European expansion, imperialism, colonialism (in a general 
way, not just one particular target area): Wolfgang J. Mommsen (1930–2004), 
Dietmar Rothermund (b. 1930), Wolfgang Reinhard (b. 1937), Reinhard Wendt 
(b. 1949), Jürgen Osterhammel (b. 1952), et al.;
2. … from a concern with historiography or with theoretical concepts of globality: 
Ernst Schulin (b. 1929), Gottfried Schramm (b. 1929), Hans-Heinrich Nolte (b. 
1938, the foremost German representative of world-system theory and editor of 
the Zeitschrift für Weltgeschichte, 2000–), Matthias Middell (b. 1961), et al.;
3. … from the history of migration: Klaus-Jürgen Bade (b. 1944), Dirk Hoerder (b. 
1943, who has been writing in English for a long time);
4. … from the history of international relations or from global economic history: a 
general option, but no German representative who would be comparable to Paul 
Bairoch or Patrick O’Brien;
5. … from a generalized concern with (cross-cultural) comparison: Michael Mit-
terauer (b. 1937), Jürgen Kocka (b. 1941), Sebastian Conrad (b. 1966) et al.;
6. … from an area specialization within Non-western history: Andreas Eckert 
(Africa), Ulrike Freitag or Birgit Schaebler (Middle East), Harald Fischer-Tiné 
(India), Marc Frey (Southeast Asia), Wolfgang Schwentker (Japan) and several 
others – most of them born after 1960.
Path (6) has been by far the most important avenue towards Global History Mark 
2 in the German-speaking countries. While very few historians of Europe have 
extended their reach to encompass the rest of the world, historians of Asia, Africa 
and Latin America are now, in quantitative as well as in qualitative terms, the most 
important practitioners of Global History. North American history is a special case 
apart. Few members of this field, strongly preoccupied as they are with transatlan-
tic relations, have felt a need to branch out globally. For a long time marginalized 
within the profession as representatives of Außereuropäische Geschichte (Non-Euro-
pean History), historians of Asia, Africa, Latin America and (very few) of the Pacific 
have been able to use the semantics of global history to enhance their standing and 
present themselves as proponents of one of the most advanced tendencies in inter-
national historiography. This has not been their principal motive, but it is making 
life easier for a small academic minority. 
The map of global historical studies in Germany is easy to draw. Apart from 
Leipzig, all the other major nuclei of global history in Germany have grown out 
of historical area studies. A basic institutional requirement for the emergence of a 
local nucleus seems to be that a history department possesses more than one senior/
tenured professorship in non-western or even non-European history. This is only 
the case at a handful of universities, among them two foundations of recent origin: 
the private Jacobs University at Bremen with professors specializing in China and 
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Southeast Asia, and the University of Erfurt, re-established in 1994 with chairs for 
North American, West Asian und East Asian history. Some of the largest and most 
prestigious departments of history in Germany have no Asian, African or Latin 
American capacities in research and teaching: Munich, Tübingen, Bonn, Frankfurt 
am Main, etc. Only one senior professor among the twenty or so at the famous 
history department of Bielefeld University is an expert on history outside Europe 
(in this case: Latin America), a similar situation obtains at the large history depart-
ment in Münster where Asia and Africa are not represented. At some places there 
is a close cooperation between “general” (i.e. European) historians and colleagues 
working as historians in departments other than History: Middle Eastern Studies 
(Islamwissenschaften), East Asian studies, etc. Such cooperation, however, depends 
entirely on personal constellations. In most cases, it lacks a firm institutional basis, 
and it is hardly ever less than fragile. Different methodological traditions are likely 
to render joint initiatives difficult. German “oriental studies” (in general) put a high 
premium on linguistic and philological training and expertise and often do not 
provide adequate instruction in the techniques and ways of thinking characteristic 
of historical research.19
All this means that only very few German universities possess the necessary 
institutional foundations for World History and Global History: Berlin (both Freie 
Universität and Humboldt Universität) with its broad range of non-European 
competence, and Leipzig, where Matthias Middell has established himself a lead-
ing methodologist of macrohistory and the most successful organizer of Global 
History events,20 are the dominating centres with Hamburg (though a shadow of 
its former greatness), Bremen (Jacobs University, with English as its language of 
instruction) and Heidelberg with its South Asia tradition trailing behind. In Austria, 
Vienna is rising to rival Berlin as a locus for global history with world-wide influ-
ence. Everywhere else, global history can only be the result of personal preferences 
of individual scholars whose main task is to teach something else, for example Jörg 
Fisch at Zurich (before that university added Africa and Southeast Asia to its choice 
of regions) or myself at Konstanz. Under such circumstances, special courses, i.e. 
Master programmes, in Global History are difficult to establish.
It is possible to distinguish between several generations in post-1945 German 
(especially West German) historiography.
(1) In the 1950s and 1960s, a small, but visible minority of historians were 
interested in World History, often crossing disciplinary borders. To mention just 
a few: the great historian of ancient Rome, Alfred Heuss (1909–1995, Göttingen), 
the medievalist August Nitschke (b. 1926, Stuttgart), or Herbert Franke (b. 1914, 
Munich), a world-authority on Yuan and Song China. Many among this group 
contributed to the multi-volume Propyläen Weltgeschichte (1960–63, named after a 
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publishing house), a major editorial achievement at the time. Some of them were 
also attached to the quarterly journal Saeculum. Jahrbuch für Universalgeschichte 
(1950–), a “yearbook” whose subtitle, according to my definitions, should be trans-
lated as World History rather than Universal History. It still exists today, perhaps 
a bit remote from current theoretical concerns, but not at all outdated, and edited 
with circumspection and imagination by the Ancient historian Jochen Martin (b. 
1936) and the Indologist Heinrich von Stietencron (b. 1933). The scholars who pub-
lish in Saeculum do not form a compact school. Many of them, however, share an 
interest in “historical anthropology”, considered not as a retrospective application 
of social or cultural anthropology (or ethnology), but as the study of elementary 
aspects of the conditio humana across civilizations.21 A new generation is now fol-
lowing in the footsteps of the founders and is gaining influence in the “Institute of 
Historical Anthropology”, a kind of network based at Freiburg i.Br. and currently 
headed by the early modernist Peter Burschel (b. 1963, Rostock). 
(2) In the 1970s, and carried over into the 1980s, a massive turn towards social 
history, or rather Historical Social Science, raised the general level of theoretical 
sophistication in (West) German historical scholarship, while narrowing the geo-
graphical focus to the problems of industrial society. With the exception of the 
United States, non-European parts of the world did not catch the attention of this 
influential school which was strongly identified with the University of Bielefeld. The 
flagship journal of this group, Geschichte und Gesellschaft (“History and Society”, 
1975–), contained almost no articles on non-European topics. This has changed 
in recent years with today more than one fifth of the articles published relating 
to Global History or a non-European region. An important impetus behind this 
change of course was the re-orientation of Jürgen Kocka, one of the intellectual 
leaders of the school, towards Transnational History.22 However, the students of the 
Bielefeld masters are, from the point of view of Global History, a lost generation. 
Interest in Global History in West Germany was at its lowest ebb in the 1970s and 
1980s when the main cohort of today’s chairholders, born in the 1950s, received 
their professional training.
(3) The current revival of Global History derives from the initiative of a new 
generation, typically born after 1960, who are now replacing the retiring post-war 
veterans on their chairs. An important journal for this generation is Comparativ 
(1991–), edited in Leipzig where Manfred Kossok, one of the most cosmopolitan 
and least doctrinaire historians of the German Democratic Republic, left a legacy of 
transatlantic studies and the comparative history of revolutions.23 The new genera-
tion has been exposed to the cultural turn, the debate about orientalism and the 
postcolonial movement in general. It has also absorbed important influences from 
ethnology and cultural anthropology. The encyclopaedic interests of the immediate 
48 ÖZG 20.2009.2
post-war generation and the euro-centric indifference of the social historians have 
been followed by a strong turn to theory – not one theory, but to a broad repertoire 
of conceptual tools. The political agenda seems to have changed, too, but that is a 
different story.
Traditions, Living and Dead
What was left after 1945 of the various German traditions of Weltgeschichte? First 
of all, it is remarkable that popular interest in world history after the War was 
enormous. Continuing an earlier German infatuation with world history,24 this con-
siderable demand among a public of educated readers contradicted the snobbish 
reservedness in academia. The Propyläen Weltgeschichte – which, back in the 1960s, 
gave me and many others of my generation our first glimpses of world history – was 
just one among several similar ventures on a grand scale. Outstanding in size and 
quality was the Fischer-Weltgeschichte published between 1965 and 1981 in 36 vol-
umes, several of them written by famous non-German authorities like the medi-
evalist Jacques Le Goff or the British historian of imperialism, David Fieldhouse. 
The latest addition to this indestructible genre is the Brockhaus Weltgeschichte (6 
vols., 1997–99), a solid work with little intellectual sparkle which I have never seen 
quoted anywhere. It continues a long line of multi-volume series that went back to 
the turn of the century around 1900 and even further to the Enlightenment. The 
attraction of world history in the early Federal Republic was probably due to a 
strong desire for cosmopolitan openness among the educated Bildungsbürger after 
the years of mental isolation and autarchy during the Nazi period.25 From a different 
perspective, it may also have been an escapist retreat from political issues into the 
vast spaces of “alien civilizations”. It is important to note that popular attitudes to 
history after 1945 were not markedly nationalistic. Already one generation of high 
school pupils of the 1960s learned a lot, sometimes from excellent school textbooks, 
about the history of India, China or Africa, even with a critical perspective on colo-
nialism. But this broad popular and educational undercurrent should not be seen as 
a scholarly tradition and did not support one. Where are the traditions?
(1) The Marxist tradition was ossified in communist East Germany into a 
schematic ideology that perpetuated crude notions of purportedly universal valid-
ity (“feudalism”, etc.). This did not devaluate the work of a few excellent scholars 
on non-Western history, especially in early periods. In West Germany the Marxist 
tradition was almost entirely absent from academic discourse. There was never a 
group of unorthodox Marxist historians similar to the British school with its master 
historians E.P. Thompson, Christopher Hill and Eric J. Hobsbawm. The discovery of 
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the Third World around 1968 hardly ever led to a historical involvement with it; few 
of the critics of the Vietnam War seriously turned to Vietnamese history. Marxism 
later reappeared in peculiar disguises as Wallersteinian world-system analysis or as 
specific forms of postcolonialism. Some of the potentials of the Marxist tradition 
merit reassessment beyond the frequent citation of Marx’s and Engels’s prophetic 
vision of incipient “globalization” (1848).
(2) The “morphological” analysis of civilizations in the footsteps of Oswald 
Spengler (1880–1936) may look like a candidate for tradition-building. But even in 
his own time, the author of Der Untergang des Abendlandes (The Decline of the West, 
1918–22) found many readers, but no serious disciples, apart from the Englishman 
Arnold J. Toynbee, a much greater historian. Toynbee was popular in Germany dur-
ing the 1950s, but had little impact upon academic historiography.
(3) Sociological evolutionism as a special form of Universal History had a few 
German adherents in the early twentieth century, especially the prolific and now 
forgotten Kurt Breysig (1866–1940), a man of greater profundity than Spengler, 
but a writer of unpenetrable prose. It never captured the imagination of historians 
and flourishes only in subsections of sociology, for example in residual forms of 
modernization theory or in the distinction between the three (universal) stages 
of segmentary, socially stratified and functionally differentiated society in Niklas 
Luhmann’s systems theory. A different model of stages can be found in the work 
of Günter Dux.26 In several books, Alfred Weber (1868–1958) outlined a universal 
sociology of culture, without convincing many people of it. Whether the very oppo-
site of evolutionism – Gottfried Schramm’s emphasis on choice and contingency 
in the bifurcation of historical pathways – will have a more profound influence, 
remains to be seen.27
(4) (Max) Weberian historical sociology cannot, in spite of Max Weber’s con-
cept of “rationalization”, be properly described as “evolutionist”. It never assumed 
institutional shape as a “school”. Max Weber (1864–1920) had to be rediscovered 
by historians from the late 1950s onwards. The Bielefeld protagonists of Histori-
cal Social Science applied some of his insights to the analysis of Western industrial 
societies and later used his concept of “charisma” to explain Bismarck’s and Hitler’s 
success. Weber’s comparative interests and his deep immersion into non-Western 
civilizations (especially India and China) during the last years of his life evoked 
only faint responses. Yet it is obvious that nothing still replaces or even surpasses 
the analytical language provided in Weber’s extensive and fragmented œuvre. Weber 
was anything but an admirer of the German “universal history” of his time which 
he dismissed as empty speculation. He rather took his universalist clues from 
extremely broad-minded contemporaries like the ancient historian Eduard Meyer 
(1855–1930) or the theologian and historian of ideas Ernst Troeltsch (1865–1923). 
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Max Weber cannot be claimed as an ancestor of Global History Mark 1, since he 
cared little for long-range interactions. However some of his categories or “ideal 
types” (i.e., “patrimonialism”, “the occidental city”, the “types of legitimate rule”), 
framed without consideration for national history, continue to be useful for com-
parative world historical analysis. While there is no compact Weberian tradition, 
Weber’s influence is pervasive, sometimes mediated through independent disciples 
like S. N. Eisenstadt (b. 1922) or Wolfgang Schluchter (b. 1938). Next to Weber, the 
only “classical” sociologist still of some influence in German world history circles is 
Norbert Elias (1897–1990). 
(5) There might have been a global economic history tradition in Germany. 
Before the First World War and until 1933, German economists and economic 
historians, many of them associated with the Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Institute of 
World Economy) in Kiel, were the most careful and astute observers of the first age 
of capitalist globalization after c. 1870. They produced a vast body of work much 
of which is still of great value. A book like August Sartorius von Waltershausen’s 
Die Entstehung der Weltwirtschaft (The Rise of the World Economy, 1931) retains its 
usefulness to the present day. This was a genuine German tradition based on the 
principles of the Historical School of Economics. For reasons that are not easy to 
understand, it was not continued after 1945. With the exception of Wolfram Fischer 
(b. 1928),28 Hans Pohl (b. 1935)29 and a handful of specialists on early modern 
colonial trade (foremost among them Hermann Kellenbenz, 1913–1990), no major 
economic historian developed an interest in the history of the world economy. The 
subject has disappeared almost entirely from the agenda of the younger generation. 
It is now reappearing as an attempt to insert Germany into early pattern of global-
ization30 and as a concern, still highly empirical and somewhat undertheorized, for 
the history of global commodities and commodity chains.31
(6) Finally, there was (and is) something that cannot be described as a well-
articulated “tradition”. It is rather an outlook, an attitude, a Haltung. A few his-
torians who had experienced the Nazi period (Ernst Schulin, Reinhart Koselleck, 
Heinz Gollwitzer, Rudolf Vierhaus, et al.) never forgot that before the triumph of 
national history in the 1880s, there had been a powerful stream of cosmopolitanism 
in German thinking and scholarship, represented by the historians of the Göttingen 
Enlightenment (Johann Christoph Gatterer, 1727–1799; August Ludwig Schlözer, 
1735–1809), by the representatives of the “Weimarer Klassik” – Johann Gottfried 
Herder, 1744–1803; Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, 1749–1832, who studied “world 
literature”; Friedrich Schiller, 1759–1805, who gave a famous inaugural lecture on 
Universal History – and by the brothers von Humboldt: Wilhelm, 1767–1835, the 
founder of comparative linguistics; Alexander, 1769–1859, the traveller, natural sci-
entist and trenchant critic of Spanish colonialism. In his famous book Weltbürger-
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tum und Nationalstaat (Cosmopolitanism and the Nation-State, 1908), the eminent 
historian Friedrich Meinecke (1862–1954) had outlined the tension between these 
two principles in German intellectual history. After 1945, several historians, includ-
ing the Saeculum group mentioned above, revived the memory of cultural sciences 
“before the nation-state”. Their direct influence on today’s younger generation of 
global historians seems to be negligible. However, they kept open a space of reflec-
tion that allowed a non-national historiography to develop alongside the German-
centred mainstream.
On the whole, only few traditions related to Global History Mark 2 survived 
the Third Reich when socialist, liberal and Jewish (who were mostly liberals) 
historians were persecuted, driven into exile or condemned to silence and when 
sociology performed a racist (völkisch) turn and abandoned Max Weber’s alleged 
“formalism”. After 1945, there were several thin lines from the past, but no stable 
continuities to build upon. Ironically, the iconoclastic historians of the late 1960s 
and 1970s – the high tide of Historical Social Sciences – and 1980s concentrated 
all their formidable efforts on a re-writing of German national history in a spirit 
of Popperian rationalism and left-of-centre political critique. Their obsession with 
a German Sonderweg – a special path in modern history pointing away from the 
“normal” West European trajectory – that was asserted rather than studied through 
patient comparisons with other European countries, emphasized the centrality of 
national history even more. Thus national history was strengthened for completely 
non-nationalistic reasons. It became a project of the moderate Left. Sometimes, a 
professional interest in non-German history even kindled the suspicion of escap-
ism, and the implied reproach that historians should not be skirting their duty to 
face the horrors of the recent German past.
There are a number of other reasons for the surprising weakness of Global 
History in a country where substantial contributions to its invention had been 
made. One is a preference, still to be found today, for a moderate Europeanization 
of historiography.32 If German historians, so the argument goes, want to extend 
their views they will be busy for a very long time improving their understanding of 
their fellow-Europeans. Why should they squander their intellectual and material 
resources by spreading them thinly over the rest of world? But the most important 
reason is another one: By comparison with almost all other European countries, 
Germany’s imperial and colonial history, if we leave aside Nazi imperialism, was 
brief (1884–1914/18), geographically restricted (to parts of Africa, a few islands in 
the Pacific and a tiny bit of China) and devoid of luster. Germans had no major 
stake in the Atlantic slave trade. Their colonies were taken over by other Euro-
pean powers after the First World War. They did not go through the tribulations 
of decolonisation. For a very long time, no voices from the former Wilhelmine 
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colonies demanded indemnities or apologies. No torture scandals involving living 
individuals disturbed the public mind as they still do from time to time in France. 
The German genocide in present-day Namibia in 1904/05 has received much pub-
licity and scholarly interest, but less because of any enduring consequences than in 
the light of the question whether or not a straight path led directly from the African 
desert to Auschwitz – the most recent re-incarnation of the Sonderweg idea.33 After 
the Second World War, immigrants into Germany did not originate from the former 
colonies, but from Turkey, Russia, the Balkans and Mediterranean Europe. For all 
these reasons, there was no imperial history in Germany to be upgraded to global 
history as it was successfully done in Britain.34 Attempts to portray present-day Ger-
many as a “postcolonial” country have failed to find much support. Global History 
therefore lacks roots both in a colonial past and a multicultural present.
The weakening of old traditions of world history writing made a re-start dif-
ficult to achieve. At the same time the lightness of tradition may have had certain 
advantages. On the one hand, an older generation kept the cosmopolitan flame 
alive. Ernst Schulin’s masterful anthology Universalgeschichte (1974), published 
at the peak of social history’s early triumphs, was a landmark event. It brought 
together reminiscences of the great tradition with exciting new work from and on 
various parts of the world. The younger generations that became active in the 1990s 
und 2000s, on the other hand, were free to respond to the many challenges that 
arrived from abroad. Their main way of responding was to throw themselves into 
theoretical debates.
Debates and Non-Debates
Some of the debates that might have been predicted, did not take place or passed 
Germany by. For example, German historians and sociologists failed to take notice 
of the global extension of the debates on revolution in the work of Theda Skocpol 
or Jack Goldstone.35 Characteristically, these authors’ celebrated books on the 
comparative historical sociology of revolutions were never translated into German. 
Since global economic history was (and is) almost non-existent, no German author 
contributed substantially to the debate about the “great divergence” triggered by 
Kenneth Pomeranz and his companions in the California School.36 “Big” world his-
tory ranging freely through the millennia has found no German advocates; almost 
all the work is done on history after 1500. The discovery of the global Middle Ages 
is still in its infancy.37 Another non-event has been the confrontation between global 
historians and their adversaries. Global History has so far gone almost unchallenged. 
Even the sharpest polemicist around, the great Hans-Ulrich Wehler (b. 1931), leader 
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of the social history revolution in the 1970s and vigorously active to the present 
day, reacted, by his own standards, with mild tolerance and did not mete out the 
harsh treatment earlier applied to diplomatic history, the history of everyday life 
(Alltagsgeschichte), to followers of Foucault or to the “new” cultural history. The 
more conservative mainstream of the profession has simply ignored Global History 
or has paid lip-service to the need to widen one’s horizon. Not even C. A. Bayly’s 
Birth of the Modern World stimulated the kind of detailed critique it was entitled 
to.38 The reviews of the original or of its German translation were invariably written 
from a basically sympathetic point of view. This is good news and bad news at the 
same time: good news because the vicious battles among German historians may 
be a thing of the past, bad news because there is a danger that Global History will 
be allowed to inhabit its own cosy little world or enclave without making a major 
impact on the discipline as a whole. A serious voicing of scepticism, for example a 
critique of the methodology or the language of Global History, would certainly be 
welcome and help Global History to strengthen its own intellectual foundations.
For lack of a forceful challenge, the German debates have mostly been friendly 
quarrels among insiders. Four of them deserve special attention.
(1) For a couple of years, the most widely used catchphrase was the adjective 
“transnational”. It signalled a cautious transcendence of national history without 
a commitment to anything non-European, inter-continental or even global. The 
category lacks precision, and it came as a challenge only to those who had been 
told that national history was the normal state of affairs. Upon closer inspection, 
however, a great many phenomena in the modern world are difficult to contain 
within national boundaries. The relationship between national and transnational 
history is not really antagonistic. It depends largely on the particular interest of an 
observer if she or he wants to privilege the national or the transnational aspect of a 
given phenomenon. Earlier in this paper, I suggested my own definition of Trans-
national History. It reflects one among several uses put forward in a debate which 
took place between 2001 and 2006 in the Journal Geschichte und Gesellschaft. The 
original question, posed by Jürgen Kocka, was a fairly specific one: Is it possible to 
research and write transnational social history? And if such social history is possible, 
how should it be done? In the course of a series of articles, unfortunately, the focus 
on social history got lost, and the original question was never comprehensively 
answered. Instead, several concepts of Transnational History were offered. They fall 
into three groups.39
(a) According to the broadest of the three concepts, Transnational History 
is simply a historiography liberated from the constraints of the nation-state. It 
includes all sorts of comparative approaches. 
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(b) A second understanding is more limited and precise. It refers to the history 
of cross-border exchanges of all kinds. This is a history of transfers and also of 
interactions between colonies and metropoles. Of course, ‘empire’ is a highly rel-
evant topic in this context. This second notion of ‘transnational’ has little room for 
comparison. As far as social history proper is concerned, it focuses on migrations 
and on the diasporas that result from them. 
(c) A third concept of Transnational History is even more restricted. It disputes 
the assumption that transnational exchanges should always emanate from ‘lower’ 
units such as regional or national societies. The basic idea is that some of these 
exchanges can achieve a life of their own and establish levels of social reality above 
national states and societies. An example for this would be mobile elite groups who 
do not cultivate any particular national identity. 
All of these three variants of Transnational History are still being used in Ger-
man programmatic statements – the aim of the debate has not been to establish the 
superiority of one of them.
(2) The second debate is closely related to the first one and took place in Ger-
many as well as internationally.40 It turned around the merits of macro-historical 
comparison. For a number of years, there was a strong interest in comparison, 
mainly between European countries or across the North Atlantic, but sometimes 
also between Europe and Japan, or even transcending the “Western world”. Those 
who recommended comparison as the apogee of historiographical sophistication 
soon met with resistance on the part of enthusiasts for a history of “entanglement” 
through transfer and interaction.41 Comparativism, as the older approach, found 
itself in some kind of tactical defence. In my personal view, this should not be 
understood as a strategic defeat. The debate over the primacy of comparison or the 
analysis of transfers is largely ill-conceived. In spite of certain logical problems that 
require attention, both approaches can be combined in praxis, as C. A. Bayly and 
others have demonstrated.42
(3) A third issue refers to the German reception of postcolonialism.43 This has 
not really led to a well-ordered debate, but rather to numerous individual choices 
and confessions of faith. The most ardent followers of postcolonial theory are to be 
found, in Germany as elsewhere, in departments of literature and in Cultural Stud-
ies. Interdisciplinary contacts between historians and students of literature (and 
popular culture) tend to be quite close in Germany. However, the study of colonial 
and imperial discourses has sometimes drifted into the hands of cultural critics who 
fail to see a need to take account of the research on colonies and colonialism done 
by historians. On the whole, the concerns of postcolonialism have created a com-
mon field of interest where divergent methodologies meet. This has made dialogue 
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easier and more difficult at the same time. I am not sure whether any original con-
tribution to postcolonial studies has so far emerged from Germany.
(4) Perhaps the most important debate about the re-interpretation of a par-
ticular period in German history has focused on the Bismarckian and Wilhelmine 
Kaiserreich of 1871 to 1914/18. That Germany after unification became a major 
international power had, of course, been no secret to historians of international 
relations. But it had never kindled the curiosity of the ‘critical’ social historians. A 
reconsideration in transnational terms tried to link the domestic with the external 
point of view while extending the scope of international or transnational topics 
to include Germany’s position in the world economy, geopolitical visions or the 
influence of immigration on the development of German national identity.44 The 
dispute sparked by this reassessment did not cast into doubt the basic legitimacy of 
such an approach. The contentious point was (and still is) whether a transnational 
perspective radically changes our idea of what the Kaiserreich was about or whether 
it merely adds a few touches of minor importance.
Finally one particular debate seems to lie ahead. The other most innovative ten-
dency in recent German historiography besides Transnational and Global History 
has been a “new history of the political”.45 Both have so far hardly taken notice of 
one another. This is basically a micro/macro problem. The new political historians 
consider politics to be symbolic communication. This aspect can best be observed 
in small spaces: ritual practices in well-defined arenas, speech acts performed inside 
the walls of a parliament building, etc. It seems to be difficult to get from there to 
the issues raised by global history – and vice versa. But the debate is urgent and it 
is likely to take place.
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